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Abstract
We introduce in a dynamic–contracting framework with moral hazard the possibility of
recapitalization as an alternative to liquidation when a firm is in financial distress. This is
achieved by considering a loss–averse agent and by allowing (but not requiring) the latter
to inject additional capital into the firm when necessary. We show that firm recapitalization
may arise in an optimal, long–term contract. As a consequence, we find that there are two
mechanisms at a firm’s disposal so as to deal with financial difficulties: one corresponds to
a recapitalization process, the other to a liquidation one. The choice of mechanism is based
on a cost–benefit analysis.
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1. Introduction
There are two basic scenarios that may be faced by a firm that is unable to honor its
commitments towards its investors: either it is liquidated by the latter and ceases to operate
or it is recapitalized by its owners and continues with its operations. Our aim in this
work is to study how this choice is made. More specifically, we examine the implications
of agency conflicts and external financing costs on the firm’s decisions regarding how to
deal with financial distress, as well as on the firm’s value. In our model, the mechanism for
addressing financial distress functions as a device that provides good–management incentives
to corporate insiders.
We start with a standard, dynamic moral–hazard setting where an entrepreneur raises
funds from outside investors to finance an investment project. The contractual relationship
between these two parties is hindered by the agency problem arising from the fact that the
entrepreneur is better informed about her project and actions than the investors are. The
only way for the latter to provide incentives to the former lies in the right to terminate the
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relationship and seize all assets, should the entrepreneur not be able to make the promised
repayments. Hence, in this model, when facing a business failure, the firm has only one
option, namely, to let the investors trigger a liquidation procedure. In practice, however,
a distressed firm can also execute an equity infusion to avoid default. Distressed equity
issuances are not rare. Jostarndt (2009) reports that in Germany, between 1996 and 2004,
123 out of 267 financially–troubled corporations issued new equity. Franks and Sanzhar
(2006) document that distressed equity issuances were a significant proportion of the total
seasoned issuances in the United Kingdom from 1989 to 1998. The present paper fills this
gap by introducing into the aforementioned framework the possibility of recapitalization.
We analyze a scenario in which a loss–averse entrepreneur contracts with risk–neutral
investors to finance a business project. The project, once funded and running, produces
at each date observable, binary cashflows, whose distribution depends on the unobservable
effort exerted by the entrepreneur. We assume, for simplicity, that the set of feasible effort
levels consists of two elements: high and low. The distribution of the cashflows under high
effort first–order stochastically dominates the one under low effort. Exerting low effort,
however, provides the entrepreneur with private benefits. To induce the entrepreneur to
choose the high effort level, the investors can use performance–based incentives, where the
entrepreneur is rewarded in the form of bonus payments in case of good performances, while
she has to bear some punishment if an unsatisfactory performance is realized. In line with the
literature, we allow the investors to punish the entrepreneur by terminating the contract. In
addition, we consider the possibility that the investors may impose some pecuniary penalty
on the entrepreneur. In such a case, there will be a monetary transfer from the latter to
the former. Such a transfer is costly to the entrepreneur, given her loss aversion. Moreover,
there is a maximum amount that she is willing to pay, which is determined by the expected,
discounted value of the cashflows accruing to her if the firm continued to operate.
We fully characterize, in an infinite–horizon setting, the optimal contracting mechanism
between the investors and the entrepreneur. After finding the optimal (abstract) mechanism,
we show that it can be implemented via debt, equity and cash reserves. In the proposed
implementation, the entrepreneur is not only the firm’s manager but also a firm’s inside
shareholder, which implies that the monetary transfer from her can be interpreted as a
recapitalization of the firm. The cost she has to bear has the natural interpretation of that
of issuing new equity. The constraint on the amount she is willing to inject reflects the fact
that, in reality, the participation of the existing shareholders in the recapitalization process
is voluntary. Thus, the choice between the two punishment devices, namely a termination
threat and a pecuniary penalty, in the general contracting framework corresponds the firm’s
choice between liquidation and recapitalization. Moreover, our formulation is able to capture
two main stylized fact related to the real–world recapitalization processes: their cost and
their voluntary nature.
We find interesting insights on the properties of the optimal resolution of financial distress.
According to our results, the firm finds itself in financial difficulties following a low–cashflows
realization when the size–adjusted cash reserves are low. The optimal mechanism to deal
with financial distress has a dichotomic structure that depends on whether recapitalization is
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more or less costly than liquidation. In the first case, once the firm has fallen into financial
distress, it should be liquidated and no recapitalization will be employed. In the second
scenario, the firm will be recapitalized up to the extent that the liquidation risk is totally
eliminated. Furthermore, we find that any distressed equity issuance must be accompanied
by debt concession, which is in line with the stylized fact reported by Franks and Sanzhar
(2006).
The analysis of the optimal contract also allows us to derive several comparative–statics
results. For instance, we find that the net issuance proceeds are decreasing in the recapi-
talization costs and increasing in the volatility of cashflows as well as in the magnitude of
the debt concession. To complement our analytical findings, we conduct a numerical anal-
ysis in which we find that: 1) the firm’s value is decreasing with the recapitalization costs;
2) the marginal value of cash increases with the recapitalization costs and the volatility of
cashflows; 3) when the moral–hazard problem becomes more severe, it is more likely that
the liquidation regime is the optimal financial–distress mechanism; 4) the recapitalization
regime is more likely to be optimal when the liquidation value of the firm is low. From those
comparative–statics results are generated several empirical predictions on the factors that
tend to promote a distressed equity issuance.
Our work is closely related to the dynamic–agency models of Biais et al. (2004), Biais et al.
(2007) and DeMarzo and Fishman (2007b). These authors analyze how financial contracts
can be designed so as to mitigate the agency conflicts between investors and entrepreneurs.
Nevertheless, they focus on the use of liquidation for incentive purposes, and do not allow
for recapitalization possibilities, i.e. in their models transfers to the entrepreneurs must
be non–negative. Our model extends the setting in Biais et al. (2004) by introducing the
option of costly recapitalization, which we show may arise as an alternative to liquidation.
Specifically, we deviate from Biais et al. (2004)’s setup in two aspects: First we assume that
the entrepreneur is loss–averse. Second we allow (but do not require) the entrepreneur to
inject money into the firm when necessary.
Our assumption that some new capital can be injected into the firm during its lifespan
is similar to Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) and DeMarzo and Fishman (2007a), who use
models of multi–period borrowing/lending under asymmetric information to explain some
facts regarding the firm’s investment decisions, its growth and its survival rate. However,
while in those papers the new capital contribution results in growth of the firm, in the present
model the additional capital serves to repay debt, so that the firm can be maintained as an
ongoing concern.
The optimal dynamic contracting problem is also analyzed in continuous–time settings by,
among others, Biais et al. (2010), DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), Hoffmann and Pfeil (2010)
and Sannikov (2008). Although a discrete–time setting might be considered more intuitive,
the main advantage of a continuous–time approach is its tractability, which stems from the
differential equations that characterize the optimal contract. This fact notwithstanding, we
have opted for a discrete–time approach, our setup being sufficiently tractable to allow us to
fully solve for the optimal contract.
The organization of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we describe the model and
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formulate the optimal–contracting problem. In Section 3 we analyze the main properties
of the optimal contract. In Section 4 we discuss in detail the implications of the optimal
contract on the firm’s decisions regarding how to deal with financial distress. Finally, we
conclude in Section 5. All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
2. The Model
2.1. General contractual environment
We work in a discrete–time, infinite–horizon setting. Our economy consists of an en-
trepreneur and a group of risk-neutral investors. All agents discount the future at the same
rate r > 0. The entrepreneur has access to a risky project that requires a start–up capital of
I, which exceeds her initial wealth A. Hence, she needs to raise funds from investors. Once
the latter have agreed to provide financing, a firm will be created to operate the project.
The cashflows generated by the project in period t are represented by the random variable
Rt, which, for simplicity, we assume takes only two values: Whenever the project is successful,
the entrepreneur collects the high cashflow Rh. If the project fails, the cashflow is Rl, which
is strictly smaller than Rh. The project’s probability of success in any period t depends
exclusively on the current effort et exerted by the entrepreneur. This results in cashflows
that are independent across periods. Again, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that only
two effort levels are possible: et = 1 (high effort) and et = 0 (low effort). The probability of
success corresponding to the effort level et is denoted by p(et) where:
p(et) =
{
p if et = 1;
p−∆p if et = 0;
and 0 < ∆p < p < 1 are given. The entrepreneur enjoys a private benefit equal to B (1− et) ,
where B is strictly positive. Hence, hard work by the entrepreneur improves the expected
profitability of the project, but it also prevents her from enjoying private benefits. The
entrepreneur’s effort is unobservable to outsiders and cannot, therefore, be contracted upon.
At the beginning of each period, and as an incentives–providing device, the investors
may decide to liquidate the firm. We shall denote by xt the firm’s continuation probability,
thus 1 − xt is the probability that the firm is liquidated. In the event of liquidation, the
non–negative proceeds from selling the firm’s assets are L.
If the firm is not liquidated in period t, the project generates the cashflow Rt. After
the cash–flow realization is observed, some monetary transfer, denoted by ct, to or from the
entrepreneur may occur. In the present setting, we do not make the standard assumption
that ct must always be non–negative1. In contrast, we allow ct to be positive or negative. A
1This assumption is usually referred to in the literature as a limited–liability constraint, which, although
appropriate in a static setting, is too strong in a dynamic one. Indeed, in a dynamic framework the firm is
treated as ongoing concern; thus, the entrepreneur can accept to inject capital if it allows the firm to continue
and generate income for her in the future. We impose below a weaker type of limited–liability constraint,
which insures that the entrepreneur’s total utility (not her current income) is non negative.
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positive ct is a cash payment to the entrepreneur, which serves as a reward to the latter. A
negative ct corresponds to a new capital injection by the entrepreneur into the firm. This
negative payment plays the role of a second punishment device besides liquidation. We stress
that in our model, capital injections do not lead to changes in the firm’s size, which contrasts
with the investment modeling proposed by Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) and DeMarzo
and Fishman (2007a). These papers also contemplate the possibility that news funds are
injected into the firm in each period. Such capital contribution, however, results in an
expansion of the firm. Moreover, while our version of capital injection serves as a device to
punish the entrepreneur and, thus, should only be executed when the firm has had a bad
performance, investment in the cited works plays the role of a reward and will, therefore,
take place following good performances. We assume that the entrepreneur’s preferences with
respect to monetary transfers are as follows:
U(ct) =
{
ct if ct ≥ 0;
(1 + τ) ct if ct < 0.
Observe that in our model the entrepreneur’s intrinsic utility for money is essentially linear,
but there is an asymmetric perception between positive and negative payments. The basic
intuition behind this is that the entrepreneur cares not only about the level of the transfer
but also about whether she is on the receiving or the giving end of the transaction. In
other words, the entrepreneur places a higher weight on losses than on gains, i.e. she is loss
averse in the sense that to her losses loom larger than gains of a comparable size2. The
additional weight τ that the entrepreneur puts on losses can be given several interpretations:
a “psychological” cost; an opportunity cost of consumption; some pecuniary cost that has
to be paid when proceeding to inject money into the firm, etc. Within the context of the
general contracting problem, we do not provide a precise meaning for τ. In Section 4, when
proposing a specific application of the present framework, we will show how τ can be related
to the cost of new equity issuance.
We normalize the entrepreneur’s reservation utility to zero and assume that, at each
period and after the cashflow is realized, the entrepreneur may choose to quit if what she
receives is less than her reservation utility. This limited commitment from the entrepreneur
has the following implications: At any period t, given that the current payment ct to the
entrepreneur is non negative, she will stay in the contractual relationship if and only if the
expected discounted utility she derives from all future transfers, henceforth referred to as her
continuation utility, is also non negative. When the current payment is negative, to avoid
2Loss aversion is a concept introduced in Prospect Theory, which was proposed by Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) as an alternative to Expected–Utility Theory to analyze decision making under uncertainty.
The essential features of this theory are that utility depends upon changes in wealth and not just on its
level, with a drop in wealth resulting in a greater disappointment than the elation created by comparable
increases. There exists a growing literature that successfully applies loss aversion to explain various problems
in finance. See, among others, Benartzi and Thaler (1995), Barberis et al. (2001), de Meza and Webb (2007),
Herweg et al. (2010) and Dittmann et al. (2010).
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any breach of contract by the entrepreneur, her continuation utility must be high enough to
compensate her for what she has to pay now. We denote by wt the entrepreneur’s expected
continuation utility at the beginning of period t. The above statements may be formalized
as follows:
wt ≥ 0 (1)
and
U(ct) +
wt+1
1 + r
≥ 0 (2)
for all t ∈ N. One may wonder why is it that in the case of a negative current payment,
the entrepreneur is willing to stay in the relationship as long as the sum of the latter and
his continuation utility is positive, whereas in the case of a positive current payment, the
condition for her to stay is simply a positive continuation utility (instead of a positive sum
of the current payment and the continuation utility, which would allow the latter to be
negative). We believe that Constraints (1) and (2) are more reasonable, since the role of
the current payments is different from that of the continuation utilities. While the current
payments represent temporary gains or losses, the continuation utilities account for the
entrepreneur’s future prospects. One may be willing to bear some temporary losses given
that the future is prosperous but no one should be expected to accept a negative future even if
today they enjoy some temporary gains. Our assumptions are justified by a timing where the
entrepreneur can decide to quit in two instances: first after the realization of cashflows but
before the current payment is settled; second after the settlement of the current payments.
Note also that Condition (2) can also be seen as a limited–liability constraint of sorts, and
it is clearly weaker than the standard constraints ct ≥ 0 and wt ≥ 0 that are commonly
imposed in the literature.
The expected cashflow under high and low effort, respectively, are defined as
R := pRh + (1− p)Rl and R := (p−∆p)Rh + (1− p+ ∆p)Rl.
We make the following assumptions on the parameters of the model:
Assumption 1. The project is profitable only if the entrepreneur monitors it carefully, i.e.
1 + r
r
R > I >
1 + r
r
(R +B).
Assumption 2. Early liquidation is inefficient, i.e. L < 1+r
r
R.
The timeline within each period is summarized in Figure 1: First the firm may be con-
tinued or liquidated. If the firm is continued, the entrepreneur decides on her effort and then
the cashflow is realized. Finally, a monetary transfer to or from the entrepreneur may occur.
2.2. Formulating the optimal–contracting problem
A long–term financing contract Φ =
{
xt, ct
}
t∈N between the entrepreneur and the in-
vestors is designed and agreed upon in period 0. We assume that all parties can commit
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to the long–term contract in the sense that they commit to not renegotiating the terms of
the contract even if some new, Pareto–improving agreement becomes available during the
course of action. In other words, we allow for the possibility that the entrepreneur reneges on
the contract but assume away the possibility of renegotiation. As we prove in Appendix B,
this is without loss of generality, since our optimal long–term contract is in fact sequentially
optimal or renegotiation–proof.
For each date t, the contract specifies, based on the entire history of observed cash-
flows, a continuation probability xt and monetary transfers ct to/from the entrepreneur.
The entrepreneur then chooses an effort strategy e =
{
et
}
t∈N. A strategy e is said to
be incentive compatible if it maximizes the entrepreneur’s expected utility given the con-
tract Φ =
{
xt, ct
}
t∈N. Therefore, an incentive compatible contract is described by a triple{
e∗, x, c
}
, where e∗ is an incentive compatible strategy that the investors want to induce. We
focus our attention on the case where it is optimal to provide incentives to the entrepreneur
so that she exerts high effort in all periods, i.e. e∗t equals 1 for all t ∈ N3.
The contractual problem can be formulated recursively using the expected continuation
utility of the entrepreneur wt as the state variable. This is a well–known fact in repeated
moral hazard models (see, e.g. Spear and Srivastava (1987)). Along the equilibrium path,
where high effort is exerted, wt is given by:
wt = E
[ ∞∑
s=t
(∏s
u=t xu
)
U(cs)
(1 + r)s−t
∣∣∣Ft],
where the filtration F = {Ft}t∈N summarizes the problem’s information structure. In each
period t, for a given wt, the optimal contract specifies: a continuation probability xt; condi-
tional on the firm not being liquidated, monetary transfers to/from the entrepreneur, ct and
ct; continuation utilities for the entrepreneur, wt+1 and wt+1, which depend on whether in
period t the cash–flow realization is Rh or Rl (see Figure 1).
Let us define the alternative state variable wct via
wct :=
wt
xt
for all t ∈ N. (3)
While wt represents the expected continuation utility of the entrepreneur at the beginning
of period t and prior to the liquidation decision, wct stands for the entrepreneur’s expected
continuation utility conditional on the firm being continued in that period.
Notice that, since we are working in an infinite horizon setting with a constant discount
factor and cashflows are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), the optimal contract
is stationary. As a consequence, only the current value of the state variable matters and we
may drop all the time subscripts.
3In fact, to ensure that the optimal level of effort is always the high effort, additional conditions are
necessary. For further discussion regarding this point we refer the reader to Biais et al. (2004).
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Figure 1: The timeline.
Let us denote by F (w) the highest possible continuation utility for the investors, given a
continuation utility w promised to the entrepreneur. The function F satisfies the following
Bellman equation:
F (w) = max
x,c,c,w,w
x
[
R− pc− (1− p)c+ pF (w) + (1− p)F (w)
1 + r
]
+ (1− x)L
for all w greater than or equal to 0, subject to the following constraints:
I. Promise keeping. The amount that the entrepreneur expects to receive at the begin-
ning of each period must be equal to the sum of the utility she derives from the transfer
paid to/from her during that period plus the expected present value of her continuation
utility:
w = x
[
pU(c) + (1− p)U(c) + pw + (1− p)w
1 + r
]
. (4)
II. Incentives to exert high effort in every period. Since the cashflows are i.i.d., the
following temporary incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) is sufficient to make the
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contract Φ =
{
x, (c, c)
}
incentive compatible:
x
[
pU(c) + (1− p)U(c) + pw + (1− p)w
1 + r
]
≥ x
[
(p−∆p)U(c) + (1− p+ ∆p)U(c)
+
(p−∆p)w + (1− p+ ∆p)w
1 + r
+B
]
.
After simplification, this yields
U(c)− U(c) + w − w
1 + r
≥ B
∆p
. (5)
Notice that the provision of incentives is spread between the current transfers and the
continuation utilities. This illustrates the benefit of an enduring relationship between
the entrepreneur and the investors: it allows the latter to smooth out the cost of
incentive compatibility over time.
III. Renegation–proofness constraint. The entrepreneur will not renege on the contract
if the following conditions are fulfilled:
(w,w) ∈ R2+ (6)
and
U(c) +
w
1 + r
≥ 0 for both pairs (c, w) and (c, w) . (7)
As a consequence of Constraint (5), Constraint (7) can be reduced to
U(c) +
w
1 + r
≥ 0. (8)
IV. Feasibility. The continuation probability must satisfy:
x ∈ [0, 1]. (9)
Before proceeding with the characterization of the optimal contract, an additional remark
is in order. In the description of the model, we interpret xt as the probability of continua-
tion. As long as the project is a constant return to scale technology, however, the program
determining the optimal contract does not change if 1 − xt represents the fraction of the
firm’s assets that are liquidated. Put differently, xt may also be interpreted as the size of the
firm at the beginning of period t. Both interpretation are frequently found in the literature.
3. Properties of the Optimal Contract
We start by analyzing some properties of the firm’s value function which is denoted by
V : for a given continuation utility for the entrepreneur w, we have that V (w) := F (w) +w.
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The value V (w) is given by
V (w) = max
x,c,c,w,w
{
x
[
R+p
(
U(c
)− c) + (1−p)(U(c)− c)+ pV (w) + (1− p)V (w)
1 + r
]
+ (1−x)L
}
(10)
for all w greater than or equal to 0, subject to the Constraints (4) - (9). The following
proposition summarizes the key properties of the firm’s value function:
Proposition 1. The value function V is concave and strictly increasing on [0, 1+r
r
pB
∆p
).
On [1+r
r
pB
∆p
,+∞) the value function satisfies V ≡ 1+r
r
R.
In order to develop some intuitive understanding, we should keep in mind that the higher
the entrepreneur’s stakes in the firm’s future cashflows are, the less severe the moral–hazard
problem becomes. When the utility level promised to the entrepreneur decreases, the moral
hazard problem gains relevance, which in turn leads to a higher risk of liquidation or capital
injection, both of which are costly. Therefore, the firm’s value is non–decreasing with respect
to the entrepreneur’s rent w. When the entrepreneur’s rent reaches 1+r
r
pB
∆p
, the asymmetric–
information problem vanishes. Accordingly, the firm’s value reaches its first–best level, which
equals the present value of a perpetual annuity of R.
Concerning the concavity of V , this property implies that the marginal contribution of
a small increase in the entrepreneur’s rent to enhancing the firm’s value becomes smaller
when this rent is already at a high level. This is due to the fact that when w is small, the
risks of liquidation and capital injection are very high. Consequently, a small augmentation
of w will have a significant impact on the firm’s value by virtue of reducing these risks. In
contrast, when w is already high, these risks are small and further reducing them does not
significantly affect the firm’s value.
3.1. Characterizing the optimal contract
We now turn our attention to the detailed provisions of the optimal contract. It follows
directly from Proposition 1 that on [1+r
r
pB
∆p
,+∞), the optimal contract is given by
x = 1, w = w =
1 + r
r
pB
∆p
, c = w − 1 + r
r
pB
∆p
and c = w − 1 + r
r
pB
∆p
+
B
∆p
.
In particular, notice that in this region the moral–hazard friction vanishes. As a consequence,
the entrepreneur’s continuation utility is independent of the outcomes: the firm will be
continued forever.
In order to determine the optimal contract on
[
0, 1+r
r
pB
∆p
)
, we proceed in three steps. We
first address, in Lemma 1, how the choice between current transfers and continuation utilities
as instruments to remunerate the entrepreneur is made.
Lemma 1. Whenever w is smaller than 1+r
r
pB
∆p
, the payments c and c made to the en-
trepreneur are non–positive.
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In other words, as long as c is positive, decreasing it in exchange for an increase of
the entrepreneur’s continuation utilities results in a higher value of the firm. Hence, given
that both parties are risk neutral and discount the future at the same rate, it is optimal to
postpone current compensations to the entrepreneur, in favor of her continuation utilities,
until the moral hazard problem becomes irrelevant.
Due to Lemma 1 and the fact that U(c) equals (1 + τ)c for non–positive values of c, we
can rewrite the promise–keeping Constraint (4), for w on
[
0, 1+r
r
pB
∆p
)
, as follows:
pc+ (1− p)c = 1
1 + τ
(w
x
− pw + (1− p)w
1 + r
)
. (11)
Inserting Equation (11) into the Objective Function (10), we find that, on [0, 1+r
r
pB
∆p
), the
Bellman equation determining to the firm’s value may be rewritten as follows 4:
V (w)− τ
1 + τ
w = max
x,w,w
{
x
[
R+
p
1 + r
(
V (w)− τ
1 + τ
w
)
+
1− p
1 + r
(
V (w)− τ
1 + τ
w
)]
+(1−x)L
}
(12)
subject to Constraints (4) - (9) together with
c, c ≤ 0. (13)
In terms of the liquidation policy, we find that it is optimal to choose a positive probability
to liquidate the firm if and only if the entrepreneur is promised a utility that is strictly smaller
than pB/∆p.
Lemma 2. Given an expected utility w promised to the entrepreneur, it is optimal to set the
firm’s continuation probability to
x = min
{
1, w
∆p
pB
}
.
Lemma 2 allows us to express the alternative state variable wc defined in Expression (3),
and which we replace for w in the sequel, in the following way:
wc =

w if w ≥ pB
∆p
pB
∆p
if 0 ≤ w < pB
∆p
(14)
We have presented in Lemmas 1 and 2 some crucial features of the optimal termination
probability and the current transfers. This sets us up to examine the (optimal) continuation
utilities. Since the incentive compatibility constraint is binding on [0, 1+r
r
pB
∆p
), we may, on
4Note that p
(
U(c
)− c) + (1− p)(U(c)− c) = τ(pc+ (1− p)c) whenever c, c ≤ 0.
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this domain, express
(
c, c
)
as follows:
c =
1
1 + τ
(
wc +
(1− p)B
∆p
− w
1 + r
)
and c =
1
1 + τ
(
wc − pB
∆p
− w
1 + r
)
. (15)
Combining Constraints (8), (9) and (13) with Expression (15) yields the following constraints
for (w,w) :
w
1 + r
≥ wc + (1− p)B
∆p
and
w
1 + r
≥ wc − pB
∆p
. (16)
We observe from the Objective Function (12) that two cases must be distinguished: either
τ is high, corresponding to the case
V ′(0) <
τ
1 + τ
or it is low, corresponding to the case
V ′(0) >
τ
1 + τ
.
We present in Proposition 2 the characterization of the optimal contract. In order to do so,
we define the following thresholds:
w∗ :=
1 + r
r
pB
∆p
, w∗∗ :=
pB
∆p
(
1 +
1
1 + r
)
and w∗∗∗ :=
pB
∆p
. (17)
Proposition 2. The optimal contract is characterized by three regimes:
(i) When wc belongs to
[
w∗,∞) the entrepreneur receives positive payments in the current
period:
c = wc − w∗ + B
∆p
and c = wc − w∗.
The entrepreneur’s continuation utilities are w = w = w∗. The firm will be operated
in the next period with probability one independently of the current cashflows.
(ii) When wc belongs to
[
w∗∗, w∗
)
no current payment is made to the entrepreneur, i.e.
c = c = 0. The entrepreneur is provided with continuation utilities as follows:
w = (1 + r)
(
wc +
(1− p)B
∆p
)
and w = (1 + r)
(
wc − pB
∆p
)
.
The firm will be in operation in the following period with probability one independently
of the current cashflows.
(iii) When wc belongs to
[
w∗∗∗, w∗∗
)
we have:
12
(a) Following a high cash–flow realization, the entrepreneur gets a zero payment, i.e.
c = 0. The firm is operated with certainty in the next period and the entrepreneur’s
continuation utility is
w = (1 + r)
(
wc +
(1− p)B
∆p
)
.
(b) Following a low cash–flow realization, there are two possibilities:
- If τ is high (i.e. V ′(0) < τ
1+τ
), the firm is liquidated in the next period with
probability
1− x = 1−
(1 + r)
(
wc − pB
∆p
)
pB
∆p
.
If the firm is continued, the utility w promised to the entrepreneur is equal to
(1 + r)
(
wc − pB
∆p
)
.
- If τ is low (i.e. V ′(0) > τ
1+τ
), the entrepreneur has to inject into the firm an
amount of money equal to
−c = 1
1 + τ
(w∗∗ − wc)
and can whereby avoid liquidation. The firm is operated in the next period
with probability 1 and the entrepreneur’s continuation utility is
w =
pB
∆p
= w∗∗∗.
For the sake of clarity, we graphically represent in Figures 2, 3 and 4 the optimal contract
described in Proposition 2.
Evolution of the entrepreneur’s utility. In general, the entrepreneur’s total utility moves in
the same direction as the cash–flow realization: It increases following a high realization and
decreases following a low one. It stops being sensitive to the firm’s cashflows only when the
firm’s accumulated performance reaches a certain threshold (see Item (i) in Proposition 2).
The sensitivity of the entrepreneur’s payoffs to the firm’s performance is useful for incentive
purposes. Moreover, the degree of this sensitivity depends on the magnitude of the moral–
hazard problem. Indeed, define the measure k of the said sensitivity as:
k :=
B
∆p (Rh −Rl) < 1.
We can rewrite the continuation utilities characterized in Item (ii) of Proposition 2 as follows:
wt+1 = (1 + r)
(
wct + k (Rt −R)
)
.
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Figure 2: The optimal monetary transfers
The current transfers are positive whenever the entrepreneur’s promised utility wt reaches the threshold w∗.
When τ is low, the monetary transfer is negative following a low cash–flow realization whenever wt is lower
than w∗∗.
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Figure 3: The optimal continuation utilities
We observe that wt+1 ≤ wt ≤ wt+1. In the case where τ is low, neither wt+1 nor wt+1 fall below pB∆p ,
regardless of the value of wt. This shows that liquidation (or downsizing) never occurs. When τ is high,
wt+1 may fall below
pB
∆p if wt is less than w
∗∗. Hence, in this case liquidation (or downsizing) happens after
a low cashflow if the utility promised to the entrepreneur is lower than w∗∗.
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Figure 4: The optimal liquidation policy
The figure shows the optimal liquidation probabilities after a low cash–flow realization.
Observe that k is increasing in the magnitude of the moral–hazard problem, which is captured
by the fraction B/∆p.
Financial distress. The firm faces financial difficulties following a low cashflow when the
entrepreneur’s stake in the firm is low. In the financial–distress situation, the firm is either
liquidated with a positive probability or it receives a fresh–capital injection that eliminates
the liquidation risk.
3.2. Initiating the contract
Proposition 2 provides the characterization of the optimal contract given an initial utility
w0 promised to the entrepreneur. To complete the characterization of the dynamics of the
contractual relationship, we must then specify w0, whose equilibrium value depends on the
allocation of bargaining power between the entrepreneur and the investors. If the investors
compete to fund the project, then w0 is such that the entrepreneur receives the highest utility
possible, provided that the investors break even:
w0 = max {w ∈ R+ | F (w) ≥ I − A} .
On the contrary, if the investors have all the bargaining power, w0 is determined via:
w0 = arg max
w∈R+
F (w).
Note that if the optimal value of w0 is less than pB/∆p, the probability that the project will
be funded is smaller than one.
4. Optimal Resolution of Financial Distress
So far we have characterized the optimal contract in terms of a mechanism that solves
the incentive problem between the entrepreneur and the outside investors. We now explore
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in detail the implications of our results on the firm’s decisions regarding how to deal with
financial distress. We first show how the above–described mechanism can be implemented
using standard securities. In the proposed implementation, the entrepreneur plays the roles
of manager and inside shareholder, which implies that a capital injection by her into the firm
can be interpreted as a recapitalization of the firm. Thus, we are able to generate interesting
insights on the features of an optimal resolution of financial distress. To complement our
analytical analysis, we conduct a numerical analysis to derive various comparative statics
that describe how the firm’s value and the optimal financial–distress mechanism vary with the
recapitalization costs, the magnitude of agency problem and the volatility of the cashflows.
Finally, we present several empirical predictions that our model generates on factors that
tend to promote a distressed equity issuance.
4.1. Implementation
Before describing the implementation, we discuss in detail what we mean by recapital-
ization and how our formulation is able to capture the main features of real–world recapi-
talization processes.
The term "recapitalization" is commonly used in practice to indicate any transaction
that leads to a significant change in a firm’s capital structure (see, for instance, Berk and
DeMarzo (2010)). Possible transactions include, for example, debt–for–equity swaps, equity–
for–debt swaps and issuances of fresh equity. In this work, what we mean by recapitalization
is an infusion of fresh funds by the firm’s shareholders. Furthermore, our formulation of
recapitalization corresponds to the case where capital injection serves to preserve the firm as
an ongoing concern and only occurs when the firm is financially distressed. In other words,
additional funds are not used to finance new investment opportunities, but rather to reinforce
the firm’s balance sheet so as to cope with commitments towards creditors. Consequently,
in our model recapitalization does not lead to any change in the firm’s size.
In practice, firm recapitalization is realized via a distressed equity issuance. New shares
can be issued through rights issues, open offers or placings. The main difference between
these methods is whether or not existing shareholders have priority in acquiring new shares.
Rights issues and open offers are preemptive public offers, meaning that existing shareholders
are given the right to participate in the offer pro rata to their existing share holdings, i.e.
existing shareholders have the right to acquire new shares in proportion to the shares that
they already hold. Only shares that are not taken up by existing shareholders are offered
to the public. This is not the case for placings, where new shares are issued to selected
subscribers only, and existing shareholders do not have, a priori, the right to participate. Our
formulation of recapitalization corresponds to the case where additional funds are raised via
a subscription–rights offering, under which new equity is allocated to existing shareholders
in proportion to their ownership. This means that the entrepreneur, as the firm’s inside
shareholder, must contribute new funds and her ownership stake remains unchanged.
Our formulation captures two main stylized fact related to the process of issuing distressed
equity. First, the process of issuing new equity to recapitalize a firm typically involves
substantial costs. Ross et al. (2008) estimate the total direct costs of seasoned equity offerings
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by US corporations from 1990 to 2003 to be, on average, 6.72% of the gross proceeds. Franks
and Sanzhar (2006) report, when studying an UK sample of distressed equity issuers from
1989 to 1998, that the costs of underwriting new equity are 12.74% of the market value of the
existing equity. This feature is taken into account by the assumption that the total utility
of the entrepreneur when injecting |ct| is (1 + τ)ct5. Since ct is what the firm really receives6,
we could interpret this assumption as follows: to inject |ct|, the entrepreneur has to pay
(1+τ)|ct|. In other words, for each monetary unit of new equity issued, the firm only receives
1/(1+τ) in cash. Hence, τ/(1+τ) represents the marginal cost of recapitalization7. Second,
in reality, the existing shareholders have the rights but not the obligations to acquire new
shares, which implies that the participation of existing shareholders in the recapitalization
process is voluntary. Constraint (2) formalizes this point, since it insures that it is in the
entrepreneur’s interest to contribute funds.
We now describe, in line with Biais et al. (2004) and Biais et al. (2007), an implementation
of the optimal contract via debt, equity and cash reserves.
Cash reserves. The firm holds cash reserves so as to meet any necessary cash outlays. The
change in the level of cash reserves in each period is equal to the net operating cashflow, plus
the interest on cash reserves, minus the payments to the entrepreneur and the financiers.
Since no further investments are made after date 0, these additional cash reserves are ac-
counted for as retained earnings in the firm’s financial statements.
Debt. Debt consists of securities that generate periodic payments.
Equity. Cashflows that are not used to pay debt claims may be used to pay a dividend to
equity holders. Dividends are paid in proportion to share ownership.
In this implementation, pay–offs and decisions of the firm are contingent on the level of
cash reserves. Put differently, the said level plays the role of a record–keeping device, as the
entrepreneur’s promised utility does in the abstract characterization of the optimal contract.
For implementation purposes, we define three thresholds:
m∗ :=
1 + r
r
p(Rh −Rl), m∗∗ := (1 + 1
1 + r
)p(Rh −Rl) and m∗∗∗ := p(Rh −Rl).
Proposition 3. The optimal contract is implemented by a combination of debt, equity and
cash reserves in the following way:
• Creation of the firm. the firm is financed by debt and equity. The entrepreneur
contributes her initial wealth A and is granted a fraction k of the equity. Investors hold
5In the general framework, we just need to specify the contribution of the inside shareholder in the
recapitalization process because only her utility matters for incentives. The “slicing and dicing” of cashflows
among outsiders (including outside shareholders) is irrelevant.
6See the definition of the function F (.).
7In fact, recapitalization costs contain some elements that are fixed and others that are proportional.
For simplicity, we only consider proportional costs.
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the remaining fraction 1 − k of the equity and all the debt. The firm uses contributed
funds to pay the investment cost and to hoard an amount of cash m0 := w0/k:
- If m0 ≥ m∗∗∗, the firm is financed at full scale, i.e. the size of the investment
equals I.
- If m0 < m∗∗∗, the firm is financed at a scale smaller than 1, i.e. the size of the
investment is equal to m0
m∗∗∗ I.
• Normally functioning firm. In each period t ∈ N, the firm pays a fixed amount R
to its debt holders. Whenever the size–adjusted cash reserves mt =
wct
k
reach m∗, the
firm distributes dividends
dt = mt −m∗ + 1
k
B
∆p
1{Rt=R+}.
• Financial distress. When mt falls below m∗∗, after low cashflows the firm is either
liquidated or restructured depending on the magnitude of the recapitalization cost:
- If the recapitalization cost is high, a fraction of assets equal to 1 − (1+r)(mt−m∗∗∗)
m∗∗∗
is liquidated. The firm continues to operate in the next period with the size equal
to (1+r)(mt−m
∗∗∗)
m∗∗∗ I and with an amount of cash mt+1 = (1 + r)(mt −m∗∗∗).
- If the recapitalization cost is low, the firm is restructured as follows: an amount
it = m
∗∗ −mt
of new equity is issued8 and the current debt service is written off by τ
1+τ
it. New
shares are allocated to the existing shareholders in proportion to their ownership.
Hence, the entrepreneur takes up a fraction k of new shares.
The proposed implementation has several features consistent with stylized facts:
Firm financial structure. The firm’s liability structure includes debt and equity. Debt is only
held by the investors, and equity is held by both the entrepreneur and the investors. Debt
corresponds to securities that generate a sequence of fixed payments. Equity is a claim on the
dividends that are distributed when cash reserves reach a contractually–specified threshold.
The dividend boundary m∗ is increasing in the volatility of the cashflows.
Financial distress. The firm is in financial distress when the size–adjusted cash reserves are
low. There are two mechanisms at the firm’s disposal so as to deal with financial distress:
- Mechanism 1. The firm is downsized by a factor 1− (1 + r)(mt−m∗∗∗)/m∗∗∗ that is
decreasing in the level of cash reserves.
8Note that because of issuance cost, the net cash inflow is 11+τ it
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- Mechanism 2. Alternatively, the firm is recapitalized via a distressed equity is-
suance. The net issuance proceeds 1
1+τ
it are decreasing in the recapitalization costs
and increasing in the volatility of the cashflows. Moreover, equity issuance is accompa-
nied by debt concession. This is consistent with a stylized fact reported in Franks and
Sanzhar (2006): creditors concessions are found to accompany the distressed equity
issuance in 30.6% of their sample firms.
We observe that, according to Mechanism 1, the firm never resorts to the recapitalization
option when it faces financial difficulties. In contrast, following Mechanism 2, once the firm
is created, no liquidation or downsizing will occur during its lifetime. Each time the firm falls
into financial distress, it will be recapitalized in order to completely avoid the risk of liquida-
tion. Hence, the two above–described mechanisms to deal with financial distress correspond,
respectively, to pure liquidation and pure recapitalization procedures. Which mechanism
is to be implemented hinges on whether liquidation or recapitalization is costlier. Given
that the the function V represents the firm’s total value, the monotonicity of the mapping
w 7→ V (w)− τ
1+τ
w accounts for the marginal cost of liquidation relative to the marginal cost
of recapitalization. Intuitively, Mechanism 1 is superior (inferior) to Mechanism 2 when the
liquidation option is less costly (costlier) than the recapitalization option.
4.2. Numerical analysis
We complement our analysis with some numerical results. Our baseline parameter values
are as follows: under high effort, the project is successful with probability equal to 0.7, and
its expected cashflow is R = 8 per period. Exerting low effort reduces the success probability
by ∆p = 0.2 but provides the entrepreneur with private benefits of B = 2. The project has a
liquidation value of L = 86. The riskless interest rate is 10%. For this choice of parameters,
we numerically solve the constrained optimization problem that generates the value function
V. This boils down to an iterative procedure to find the unique fixed point of the mapping
v 7→ Tv defined via the Objective Function (10) subject to Constraints (4) - (9)9. In order
to distinguish the value functions arising in the cases of high or low recapitalization costs,
we denote in the sequel the value function by Vl in the first case and by Vr in the second one.
First, we pin down the cut–off threshold for the value of τ that determines the boundary
between the two mechanisms used to deal with financial distress. We plot in Figure 5 the
values of V ′r (0) and V ′l (0) functions of τ 10, together with the graph of the function f(τ) =
τ
1+τ
.
These graphs intersect at τ ∗ ' 0.19. We observe that, when τ < τ ∗, it holds that V ′r (0) >
V ′l (0) >
τ
1+τ
. For values of τ above this threshold, the inequalities are reverted. Hence, if the
proportional costs of recapitalization are less than 19%, the firm is optimally recapitalized
when it falls into financial distress. In the other case, the firm could be liquidated should it
find itself in financial difficulties.
Figure 6 shows how the recapitalization costs affect the firm’s value. We observe that
as long as τ is less than τ ∗, the firm’s value is strictly decreasing with τ . When τ increases
9We make our code available upon request.
10Since V ′l (0) is independent of τ , the corresponding graph is a horizontal line at the level 0.1616
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Figure 5: The cut–off threshold for τ
above τ ∗, there is a switch from the recapitalization regime to the liquidation regime, and
then firm value is independent of τ.
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We plot in Figures 7(a) and 7(b) the first derivative of the value function V for different
levels of the recapitalization costs and the volatility of cashflows, respectively11. This is of
interest since, as we have seen in Section 4.1, the first derivative of the value function V
can be interpreted as the marginal value of cash. We observe that the firm’s value is more
responsive to changes in its cash reserves when the recapitalization costs or the volatility of
cashflows are high12.
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Figure 7: The marginal value of cash
To illustrate the effect of the firm’s profitability, measured by R, and of the magnitude of
the moral–hazard problem, captured by the fraction B/∆p, as well as that of the liquidation
value L, on the optimal resolution of financial distress, we plot in Figure 8 the first derivative
of Vl and Vr at 0 as functions of R. In Figure 9, we show the first derivative of Vl and Vr at
0 as functions of B/∆p for two values of L. The plots correspond to the choice τ = τ ∗, the
11To vary the volatility, while keeping the expected cashflows fixed at 8, we set Rh ≡ 15. This implies
that, as a function of the probability of success, Rl(p) = (8 − 15p)/(1 − p). After simplifications we obtain
Var[R](p) = 49p/(1 − p); thus, the volatility of cashflows is increasing in p. We have set τ = 0.15 in our
example.
12A disclaimer is in order here. We have approximated the value of Vr via an iterative algorithm that
converges quite rapidly in the topology of uniform convergence. As finer grids are employed, the convergence
to the true solution is guaranteed. The latter, however, is not the case for V ′r . This is due to the fact that
the linear interpolates of the iterates are, a priori, not concave. This is akin to a chattering solution in the
context of the Calculus of Variations (see, eg. Ekeland and Turnbull (1983)). In order to deal with this issue
we compute the smallest, piecewise–linear, concave majorant of each iterate and its corresponding derivative.
This results in a sequence of uniformly convergent concave functions, whose derivatives, by the Arzelà–Ascoli,
also converge uniformly. The said uniform limit is a good approximation of the true derivative, but it is
very non–smooth. For illustration purposes, the plots in Figures 7(a) and 7(b) have been smoothed out.
We refer the reader to Choné and LeMeur (2001) and Ekeland and Moreno-Bromberg (2010), as well as the
references therein, for a thorough discussion on the difficulties of approximating derivatives in variational
problems when convexity/concavity constraints are imposed.
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remaining parameters being as above. We observe that when the firm’s profitability is low or
when the moral–hazard problem becomes more severe, it is more likely that the liquidation
regime is the optimal one. Concerning the liquidation value L, when it decreases (say, from
L = 86.7 in Figure 9(b) to L = 86 in Figure 9(a)), liquidation becomes more costly, which
explains why the recapitalization regime is more likely to be the optimal one.
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Figure 8: The effects of R on the optimal financial–distress mechanism
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Figure 9: The effects of B/∆p and L on the optimal financial–distress mechanism
In order to illustrate the dynamics of the entrepreneur’s continuation utility, we simulate
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the firm’s cash–flow dynamics R =
{
Rt
}
t∈N, which follow at each date a binomial distribution
with p = 0.7. We take Rh = 15 and Rl = −25/3 so that the expected cashflow per period
is exactly 8. We assume that the entrepreneur has no initial capital (A = 0), the initial
investment costs I are equal to 70 and the investors are competitive. Hence, the initial
utility w0 promised to the entrepreneur is
w0 = max {w ∈ R+ | F (w) ≥ I − A} .
We plot in Figure 10 two paths of the entrepreneur’s continuation utility when the recap-
italization cost is high. In the first path, the firm is closed after two successive failures.
In the second path, the firm is downsized two times but it recovers after each failure and
after approximately 32 periods the entrepreneur’s continuation utility reaches the absorbing
threshold w∗ = 77.
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Figure 10: Dynamics of the entrepreneur’s continuation utility in the case of high recapital-
ization costs
Figure 11 shows a path of the entrepreneur’s continuation utility in the case of low
recapitalization costs13. We see that it never falls below pB/∆p, which means that the firm
is never downsized after being created. The firm is completely safe after 40 periods.
4.3. Empirical Predictions
The model delivers interesting predictions related to the factors that affect the firm’s
incentives to raise equity when it finds itself in a state of distress. Empirical evidence on
distressed equity issuance is still very sparse. The pioneering work is Franks and Sanzhar
13The plot corresponds to the choice τ = 0.15.
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ization costs
(2006) followed by Jostarndt (2009). Both papers focus on the impact of debt overhang on
the prospect of a successful equity issue. They start with the argument of Myers (1977) that
any infusion of equity reduces the riskiness of the firm’s outstanding debts, thus transferring
wealth from owners to creditors. As a consequence, firms are reluctant to raise distressed
equity when the debt–overhang problem is severe. The results are mixed: While Franks and
Sanzhar (2006) do not find any strong evidence of the negative effect of debt overhang on
equity issuance for their sample of UK firms, Jostarndt (2009) reports that his results for a
sample of German firms support the hypothesis that the debt–overhang problem inhibits the
infusion of distressed equity. Both papers agree on the point that debt concessions granted
by the firm’s lenders positively contribute to the success of equity issuance. Our result that
the amount raised through an equity issue is increasing with the size of debt forgiveness is
consistent with this evidence. We list below some other predictions derived from our model:
Prediction 1: Financially–distressed firms are less likely to complete an equity issue in
periods of high external financing costs.
This prediction relates directly to our result that firms will choose to raise distressed
equity only when the recapitalization cost is low. Therefore, we could expect that financially
distressed firms are more prone to conduct an infusion of fresh equity during downturns.
Prediction 2: A severe asymmetric–information problem will hamper an equity issue.
This prediction pertains to our discussion about the effect of the magnitude of the moral–
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hazard problem on the optimal mechanism to deal with financial distress. It suggests that
firms whose ownership structure is more concentrated or whose debts are held by sophisti-
cated investors are more likely to complete an equity issue when in a state of distress. The
intuition is that for such firms, the asymmetric–information problem is less severe. Indeed,
sophisticated creditors have better skills to monitor the firms’ managers, which reduces the
magnitude of the moral–hazard problem. As for the concentration of ownership, its helps to
alleviate the free–rider problem among outside shareholders and, thus, may improve moni-
toring.
Prediction 3: Firms that have more intangible assets are more likely to performing a
distressed equity issue.
This prediction relates to our discussion on the role that the liquidation value plays when
the firm deals with financial difficulties. We would expect that firms with more tangible
assets have higher liquidation values than firms with otherwise similar characteristics but
less tangible assets. Consider, for example, a bank and a manufacturing firm. In general,
the value of a bank’s assets depends heavily on its private information (i.e. the bank’s value
depends greatly on its intangible assets), while the value of a manufacturing firm is simpler
to evaluate. Therefore, Prediction 3 implies that we expect to observe more liquidation
processes in the manufacturing sector than in the financial one.
Prediction 4: For firms in financial distress, low future–growth opportunities will impair
the prospect of a successful equity issue.
Low future–growth opportunities correspond to a low going–concern value, which clearly
reduces the shareholders’ incentives to provide funds. Hence, we should expect that finan-
cially distressed firms in sectors such as the technology one are more likely to be rescued
through an infusion of fresh equity.
Prediction 5: Firms with more volatile cashflows should raise a higher amount when
completing a distressed equity issue.
Whenever the volatility of cashflows increases, there is a higher risk that the cash reserves
drop to an unsustainable level, which induces the firm to raise a bigger amount of equity. In
doing so, the firm can avoid tapping the market frequently.
5. Conclusions
We have proposed a dynamic–contracting model that can incorporate the possibility of
recapitalization and have shown how a firm should choose between two options, liquidation
or recapitalization, when facing financial difficulties. Our model analyzes the relationship
between an entrepreneur and investors regarding the financing of a business project where
the distribution of the cashflows is determined by the unobserved effort of the former. To
provide incentives to the entrepreneur, the investors can either impose a pecuniary penalty
or terminate the project, which corresponds to recapitalization or liquidation of the firm,
respectively. These choices have been determined via the characterization of the optimal
contract. Which mechanism should be employed is based on a costs comparison.
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Appendix
Appendix A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. We first prove that there exists a unique, continuous and bounded
solution V to the Maximization Problem (10) subject to the Constraints (4) - (9). Let
Cb(R+) be the space of bounded, continuous, real–valued functions defined on R+ and define
an operator T on Cb(R+) via the program:
Tv(w) = max
x,c,c,w,w
{
x
[
R+ p (U(c)− c) + (1− p) (U(c)− c) + pv(w) + (1− p)v(w)
1 + r
]
+ (1−x)L
}
(1)
for all non–negative w, subject to
x
[
pU(c) + (1− p)U(c) + pw + (1− p)w
1 + r
]
= w; (2)
U(c)− U(c) + w − w
1 + r
≥ B
∆p
;
U(c) +
w
1 + r
≥ 0;
(x,w,w) ∈ [0, 1]× R2+.
Proving there exists an unique, continuous and bounded function V that solves the Maxi-
mization Problem (10) subject to the Constraints (4) - (9) amounts to showing that T has
a unique fixed point. To this end, we show below that T maps Cb(R+) into itself and that
it is a contraction, and then invoke Banach’s Fixed Point Theorem.
Consider v in Cb(R+). First observe that U(c)− c is smaller than or equal to zero for all
c in R, which together with the fact that the map w 7→ v(w) is bounded implies that Tv
is bounded above. Let wˆ be the smallest point at which the mapping w 7→ v(w) attains its
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maximum14. It is clear that(
x, c, c, w, w
)
=
(
1,
1
p
(
w − wˆ
1 + r
)
, 0, wˆ, wˆ
)
is a solution to the program for all w greater than pB
∆p
+ wˆ
1+r
. This yields
Tv(w) = Tv
(pB
∆p
+
wˆ
1 + r
)
= R +
v(wˆ)
1 + r
for all w ∈
(pB
∆p
+
wˆ
1 + r
,∞
)
.
For any value of w on
[
0, pB
∆p
+ wˆ
1+r
]
, there is no loss of generality to restrict (x, c, c, w, w) to
D := [0, 1]×
[
− wˆ
(1 + τ) (1 + r)
,
B
∆p
]
×
[
− wˆ
(1 + τ) (1 + r)
, 0
]
× [0, wˆ]2 .
It then follows that Tv(w) is also bounded below and that the mapping w 7→ Tv(w) is con-
tinuous on
[
0, pB
∆p
+ wˆ
1+r
]
, since the function under the maximization operator is continuous
and the set D is compact. Given that we have continuous pasting at w = pB/∆p+wˆ/(1+r),
we conclude that Tv belongs to Cb(R+), i.e. the operator T maps Cb(R+) into itself. It is
straightforward to verify that T satisfies Blackwell’s sufficient conditions to be a contrac-
tion: monotonicity and discounting. Hence, we may use Banach’s Fixed Point Theorem to
conclude that T has an unique fixed point V ∈ Cb(R+).
Next we show that V is non decreasing. For this purpose, let w and w′ be two non–
negative values such that w′ is greater than w. Let (x, c, c, w, w) be a solution to the program
that defines Tv(w). Observe there is no loss of generality in assuming that x is strictly
positive, since otherwise the project would be downsized to zero. Consider c′ such that
p
(
U(c′)− U(c)) = w′ − w
x
> 0.
U(c) is an increasing function, thus c′ is greater than c. We claim that the choice
(
x, c′, c, w, w
)
is feasible for the program that defines Tv(w′). Indeed
x
(
pU(c′) + (1− p)U(c) + pw + (1− p)w
1 + r
)
= x
(
w′ − w
x
+
w
x
)
= w′,
and
U(c′)− U(c) + w − w
1 + r
> U(c)− U(c) + w − w
1 + r
≥ B
∆p
.
14Since v(w) is a continuous, bounded function, such a wˆ exists.
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Due to the fact that the mapping c 7→ U(c)− c is non decreasing, we have
Tv(w′) ≥ x
[
R+ p
(
U(c′
)− c′) + (1− p)(U(c)− c)+ pV (w) + (1− p)V (w)
1 + r
]
+ (1− x)L
≥ x
[
R+ p
(
U(c
)− c)+ (1− p)(U(c)− c)+ pV (w) + (1− p)V (w)
1 + r
]
+ (1− x)L
= V (w),
i.e. Tv is a non–decreasing function.
In order to show that V is concave, we define, for all w greater than or equal to pB/∆p,
the following auxiliary program:
T cv(w) := max
c,c,w,w
{
R + p (U(c)− c) + (1− p) (U(c)− c) + pv(w) + (1− p)v(w)
1 + r
}
subject to
pU(c) + (1− p)U(c) + pw + (1− p)w
1 + r
= w,
(
w,w
) ∈ R2+,
U(c)− U(c) + w − w
1 + r
≥ B
∆p
and U(c) +
w
1 + r
≥ 0.
We may then write
Tv(w) = max
x,wc
{
xT cv(wc) + (1− x)L} for all w ≥ 0
subject to
xwc = w, x ∈ [0, 1] and wc ∈
[pB
∆p
,∞
)
.
We first show that if v is concave so is T cv. To this end, consider w and w′ greater than
or equal to pB/∆p and let
(
c, c, w, w
)
and
(
c′, c′, w′, w′
)
be solutions to the programs that
define T cv(w) and T cv(w′), respectively15. For λ in (0, 1) define wλ := λw + (1 − λ)w′ ,
wλ := λw + (1 − λ)w′, wλ := λw + (1 − λ)w′, cλ := U−1
(
λU(c) + (1 − λ)U(c′)) and
cλ := U
−1(λU(c) + (1− λ)U(c′)). Observe that
U(cλ) +
wλ
1 + r
≥ 0 and U(cλ)− U(cλ) +
wλ − wλ
1 + r
≥ B
∆p
.
15Given the relation between Tv and T cv and the fact that for any w ≥ 0 there exist a solution to the
program that defines Tv(w), the same holds true in the case of T cv(w) for all w ≥ pB∆p .
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Hence,
(
cλ, cλ, wλ, wλ
)
is feasible for the program that defines T cv(wλ), which implies
T cv(wλ) ≥ R + p (U(cλ)− cλ) + (1− p)
(
U(cλ)− cλ
)
+
pv(wλ) + (1− p)v(wλ)
1 + r
By concavity of v we have v(wλ) ≥ λv(w) + (1− λ)v(w′) and v(wλ) ≥ λv(w) + (1− λ)v(w′).
Given that U(.) is concave and non decreasing, we have cλ ≤ λc+ (1− λ)c′ so
U(cλ)− cλ ≥ λ [U(c)− c] + (1− λ)
[
U(c
′
)− c′
]
.
The analogous relation holds for U(cλ)− cλ, therefore
T cv(wλ) ≥ λT cv(w) + (1− λ)T cv(w′)
as required.
Next we establish the concavity of Tv. We have
Tv(w) = max
wc
{
w
[T cv(wc)− L
wc
]}
+ L
for all non–negative w, subject to
wc ≥ max
{
w,
pB
∆p
}
.
Define wˆ∗ := wˆ/(1 + r) + pB/∆p. In analogous fashion as we did for Tv, one can ver-
ify that T cv is continuous on its domain and constant over
[
wˆ∗,∞). The latter implies
that the mapping wc 7→ (T cv(wc) − L)/wc reaches its maximum on [ pB
∆p
, wˆ∗
]
. Denote the
arg max
{
(T cv(wc)−L)/wc} by [wc, wc], with wc greater than or equal to pB/∆p. We then
have
arg max
wc≥max
{
w, pB
∆p
}T cv(wc)− Lwc =

w if w ≥ wc;
[w,wc] if wc > w ≥ wc;
[wc, wc] if wc > w ≥ 0.
This implies that
Tv(w) =
{
T cv(w) if w ≥ wc;
wK + L if 0 ≤ w < wc.
Here K equals (T cv(wc)− L)/wc, which is independent of w; therefore, Tv is concave.
Now, we show that V is strictly increasing on [0, 1+r
r
pB
∆p
) and constant on [1+r
r
pB
∆p
,+∞).
Indeed, we have already shown that
V (w) = R +
V (wˆ)
1 + r
if w ≥ pB
∆p
+
wˆ
1 + r
,
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where wˆ is smallest point at which the mapping w 7→ V (w) attains its maximum. If V were
constant on some interval [w1, w2] with w2 smaller than pB/∆p+wˆ/(1+r), then by concavity
it would be constant on
[
w1,
pB
∆p
+ wˆ
1+r
]
. This would imply that
(
x, c, c, w, w
)
=
(
1, B
∆p
, 0, wˆ, wˆ
)
would be a solution to the program that defines V (w1) and so, w1 = pB∆p +
wˆ
1+r
, which is a
contradiction. Hence, V (w) is strictly increasing over
[
0, pB
∆p
+ wˆ
1+r
)
. Moreover, it is constant
over
[
pB
∆p
+ wˆ
1+r
,+∞), which implies
pB
∆p
+
wˆ
1 + r
= min
{
arg max
{
V (w)}
}
⇒ pB
∆p
+
wˆ
1 + r
= wˆ ⇒ wˆ = 1 + r
r
pB
∆p
.
Finally, from the relation V (wˆ) = R + V (wˆ)/(1 + r) we obtain V (w) = R(1 + r)/r for all
w that are greater than or equal to (1+r)pB
r∆p
.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let us first assume that, for w strictly smaller than 1+r
r
pB
∆p
, there exists
a solution
(
x, c, c, w, w
)
to the Maximization Problem (10) subject to the Constraints (4)
- (9) such that c > 0. Since c is strictly greater than zero, there exists a ε > 0 such that
c− ε ≥ 0. Define
c′ := c− ε and w′ := w + (1 + r)ε > w.
It is straightforward to verify that
(
x, c, c′, w, w′
)
is also feasible for the Maximization Prob-
lem (10). Since V (w) is a non–decreasing function and U(c) − c equals zero for all non–
negative c, we have:
x
[
R + p
(
U(c)− c)+ (1− p)(U(c)− c)+ pV (w) + (1− p)V (w)
1 + r
]
+ (1− x)L
≤ x
[
R + p
(
U(c)− c)+ (1− p)(U(c′)− c′)+ pV (w) + (1− p)V (w′)
1 + r
]
+ (1− x)L.
Therefore, there is no loss of generality in restricting the set of feasible solutions to the
Maximization Problem (10) by assuming that c is non–positive whenever w is strictly smaller
than 1+r
r
pB
∆p
. By analogous argument we may also assume that, on the same range for w, c is
non–positive.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2. Constraints (4) - (8) imply x is smaller than or equal to w/
(
pB
∆p
)
.
Given that x is bounded above by one we have
0 ≤ x ≤ min
{
1,
w
pB
∆p
}
.
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We first show, by the way of contradiction, that for w on
[
pB
∆p
, 1+r
r
pB
∆p
)
it is optimal to choose
x equal to 116. To this end, let us assume that, for w on the said interval, there exists a
solution
(
x1, c1, c1, w1, w1
)
to the Maximization Problem (12) such that x1 is strictly smaller
than 1. We have17:
R +
p
1 + r
(
V (w1)− τ
1 + τ
w1
)
+
1− p
1 + r
(
V (w1)−
τ
1 + τ
w1
)
> L (3)
Let us define the non–negative quantities
α :=
w
x1
− w, β := U(c1)− U(c1) +
w1 − w1
1 + r
− B
∆p
, and γ := U(c1) +
w1
1 + r
(in fact α is strictly positive). From Constraint (4) and the fact that w is greater than or
equal to pB
∆p
we have
pβ +
pB
∆p
+ γ = w + α ≥ pB
∆p
+ α.
Therefore
pβ + γ ≥ α. (4)
Next we define c2 and c2 via the relations U(c2) = U(c1)− ε, and U(c2) = U(c1)− ω, where
ε and ω are solutions to the system
pε+ (1− p)ω = α,
ε, ω ≥ 0,
max
{
0, α− pβ} ≤ ω ≤ min{γ, α
1− p
}
.
This system has a solution, since, by Inequality (4), each of the elements under the max{·, ·}
operator is bounded above by each of the elements under the min{·, ·} one. Let x2 = 1,
w2 = w1, and w2 = w1. It is straightforward to verify that the quintuple
(
x2, c2, c2, w2, w2
)
satisfies the Constraints (4) - (9) and (13). Therefore
(
x2, c2, c2, w2, w2
)
are feasible for the
16We have already established, as a consequence of Theorem 1, that x ≡ 1 for w greater than 1+rr pB∆p .
17Otherwise, we have
x1
[
R+
p
1 + r
(
V (w1)− τ
1 + τ
w1
)
+
1− p
1 + r
(
V (w1)−
τ
1 + τ
w1
)]
+ (1− x1)L ≤ L
which contradicts the fact that
(
x1, c1, c1, w1, w1
)
is the solution to the Maximization Problem.
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Maximization Problem (12). Furthermore, we have
V (w) =
τ
1 + τ
w + x1
[
R +
p
1 + r
(
V (w1)− τ
1 + τ
w1
)
+
1− p
1 + r
(
V (w1)−
τ
1 + τ
w1
)]
+ (1− x1)L
<
τ
1 + τ
w +R +
p
1 + r
(
V (w1)− τ
1 + τ
w1
)
+
1− p
1 + r
(
V (w1)−
τ
1 + τ
w1
)
=
τ
1 + τ
w + x2
[
R +
p
1 + r
(
V (w2)− τ
1 + τ
w2
)
+
1− p
1 + r
(
V (w2)−
τ
1 + τ
w2
)]
,
where the inequality is due to x1 being smaller than 1 and Inequality (3). This contradicts
the optimality of
(
x1, c1, c1, w1, w1
)
, thus, when w belongs to
[
pB
∆p
, 1+r
r
pB
∆p
)
it is optimal to let
x = 1.
Next we look at the case where w belongs to
[
0, pB
∆p
)
and show that it is optimal to choose
x equal to w/
(
pB
∆p
)
. In analogous fashion to the previous part, assume that, for w on the
said interval, there exists a solution
(
x3, c3, c3, w3, w3
)
to the Maximization Problem (12)
such that x3 is strictly smaller than w/
(
pB
∆p
)
. Notice that c3 and c3 satisfy the non–positivity
Constraint (13). Let us define the non–negative quantities
α1; = U(c3)− U(c3) +
w3 − w3
1 + r
− B
∆p
, β1 = U(c3) +
w3
1 + r
and γ1 =
w
x3
− pB
∆p
(in fact γ1 is strictly positive). Next define c4 and c4 through the relations U(c4) = U(c3)−
α1−β1 and U(c4) = U(c3)−β1 and set x4 = w/
(
pB
∆p
)
, w4 = w3 and w4 = w3. It is immediate
to check that
(
x4, c4, c4, w4, w4
)
satisfies the Constraints (4) - (9) and (13). Moreover:
V (w) =
τ
1 + τ
w + (1− x3)L
+ x3
[
R +
p
1 + r
(
V (w3)− τ
1 + τ
w3
)
+
1− p
1 + r
(
V (w3)− τ
1 + τ
w3
)]
<
τ
1 + τ
w + (1− x4)L
+ x4
[
R +
p
1 + r
(
V (w4)− τ
1 + τ
w4
)
+
1− p
1 + r
(
V (w4)−
τ
1 + τ
w4
)]
,
which contradicts the optimality of
(
x3, c3, c3, w3, w3
)
.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. We have to find the optimal continuation utilities within the
following two cases:
When τ is high
(
V′(0) < τ
1+τ
)
. We know from Proposition 1 that the value function V
is concave. Therefore, the condition V ′(0) < τ/(1 + τ) implies that V ′(w) is smaller than
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τ/(1 + τ) for all non–negative w. In other words, the mapping w 7→ V (w) − wτ/(1 + τ) is
decreasing on R+, thus the term
R +
p
1 + r
(
V (w)− τ
1 + τ
w
)
+
1− p
1 + r
(
V (w)− τ
1 + τ
w
)
in the Objective Function (12) is maximized when the (lower–bound) constraints on w and
w are tight. Consequently, for w in
[
0, 1+r
r
pB
∆p
)
we have, at the optimum
w = (1 + r)
(
wc +
(1− p)B
∆p
)
and w = (1 + r)
(
wc − pB
∆p
)
. (5)
Substituting Expression (5) into Expression (15) we obtain that both c and c equal 0.
When τ is low
(
V′(0) > τ
1+τ
)
. When V ′(0) is greater than τ/(1+τ), there exists a positive
w˜ such that the mapping w 7→ V (w)−wτ/(1+τ) is increasing below w˜ and decreasing above
it. We first pin down w˜ in the following auxiliary lemma:
Lemma 3. If V ′(0) is greater than τ/(1 + τ), then the mapping
w 7→ V (w)− τ
1 + τ
w
is maximized at w˜ = pB/∆p.
Proof. Define the function H :
[
0, 1+r
r
pB
∆p
)→ R+ via
H(w) := V (w)− τ
1 + τ
w.
We have from the Maximization Program (12) that H(w) is determined by the following
program:
H(w) = max
x,w,w
{
x
[
R +
pH(w) + (1− p)H(w)
1 + r
]
+ (1− x)L
}
subject to
w
1 + r
≥ w
x
+
(1− p)B
∆p
,
w
1 + r
≥ w
x
− pB
∆p
(6)
and
x = min
{
1, w/
(pB
∆p
)}
, (7)
where the Constraints (6) correspond to Constraints (16) with w/x substituted for wc. Since
V is concave so is H and clearly H(0) = L. Moreover, if V ′(0) is strictly greater than
τ/(1 + τ), then H ′(0) is strictly greater than zero.
We first show that the mapping w 7→ H(w) is non–increasing whenever w is greater than
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or equal to pB/∆p. To this end consider wa and wb such that
wa ≥ wb ≥ pB
∆p
.
Let
(
1, wa, wa
)
be a solution to the program that defines H
(
wa
)
. Hence, from Constraints
(6) we have
wa
1 + r
≥ wa + (1− p)B
∆p
≥ wb + (1− p)B
∆p
and
wa
1 + r
≥ wa − pB
∆p
≥ wb − pB
∆p
,
which means
(
1, wa, wa
)
is feasible for the program that defines H(wb). Then we get
H(wb) ≥ R + pH(wa) + (1− p)H(wa)
1 + r
= H(wa),
as required.
Next we show that the mapping w 7→ H(w) is non–decreasing when w belongs to [0, pB
∆p
)
.
Notice that in such case, it holds that x equals w/
(
pB
∆p
)
. Thus, on the interval at hand the
program defining the function H(·) can be rewritten as follows:
H(w) = max
w,w
w
pB
∆p
[
R +
pH(w) + (1− p)H(w)
1 + r
]
+
(
1− w
pB
∆p
)
L
subject to
w
1 + r
≥ B
∆p
, and
w
1 + r
≥ 0.
First, we prove that H(w) is greater than or equal to L for all w on
[
0, pB
∆p
)
. By hypothesis
H ′(0) is strictly positive, thus there exists ε greater than 0 such that H(·) is an increasing
function on (0, ε]. Since H(0) equals L, this implies that H(wc) is greater than or equal to
L for any wc on (0, ε]. Let
(
wc, wc
)
be a solution to the program that defines H
(
wc
)
, then
H(wc) =
wc
pB
∆p
[
R +
pH(wc) + (1− p)H(wc)
1 + r
]
+
(
1− wc
pB
∆p
)
L ≥ L;
therefore
R +
pH(wc) + (1− p)H(wc)
1 + r
− L ≥ 0. (8)
Clearly, for any wd on
(
ε, pB
∆p
)
the vector
(
wc, wc
)
is a feasible choice for the program that
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defines H
(
wd
)
. This implies
H(wd) ≥ wdpB
∆p
[
R +
pH(wc) + (1− p)H(wc)
1 + r
]
+
(
1− wd
pB
∆p
)
L
≥ wc
pB
∆p
[
R +
pH(wc) + (1− p)H(wc)
1 + r
]
+
(
1− wc
pB
∆p
)
L = H(wc) ≥ L,
where the second inequality follows from Inequality (8). We conclude that H(w) is greater
than or equal to L for all w on
[
0, pB
∆p
)
.
Now let we and wf be such that:
0 ≤ wf ≤ we < pB
∆p
.
Hence, H(wf ) is greater than or equal to L. Let
(
wf , wf
)
be a solution to the program that
defines H
(
wf
)
. We thus have:
H(wf ) =
wf
pB
∆p
[
R +
pH(wf ) + (1− p)H(wf )
1 + r
]
+
(
1− wf
pB
∆p
)
L ≥ L
which implies that
R +
pH(wf ) + (1− p)H(wf )
1 + r
− L ≥ 0. (9)
Since
(
wf , wf
)
is feasible for the program that defines H
(
we
)
, we get
H(we) ≥ wepB
∆p
(
R +
pH(wf ) + (1− p)H(wf )
1 + r
)
+
(
1− we
pB
∆p
)
L
≥ wf
pB
∆p
(
R +
pH(wf ) + (1− p)H(wf )
1 + r
)
+
(
1− wf
pB
∆p
)
L = H(wf ),
where the second inequality follows from Inequality (9). This concludes the proof of the
auxiliary lemma.

With Lemma 3 in hand, we now continue with the proof of Proposition 2. Since wc is
greater than or equal to pB/∆p, the right–hand side of the first expression in Constraints (16)
is strictly greater than pB/∆p. Therefore, a w satisfying (16) must be larger than pB/∆p.
As a consequence, at the optimum, we have
w = (1 + r)
(
wc +
(1− p)B
∆p
)
,
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which in turn implies c = 0. Relative to w, we follow an analogous reasoning and we get,
using the Thresholds (17), the following result:
w =
{
(1 + r)
(
wc − pB
∆p
)
if w∗∗ ≤ wc < w∗;
pB
∆p
if w∗∗∗ ≤ wc < w∗∗.
The optimal choice for c is derived from Expression (15). We find that if wc belongs to[
w∗∗∗, w∗∗
)
then c takes a negative value.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. We need to establish that the entrepreneur’s utility in the imple-
mentation is the same as in the optimal contract.
- When mt ≥ m∗, which is equivalent to wct ≥ w∗, the optimal contract requires that:
ct = w
c − w∗ + B
∆p
, ct = w
c − w∗ and wt+1 = wt+1 = w∗.
In the implementation, we specify that the firm distributes a dividend
dt = mt −m∗ + 1
k
B
∆p
1{Rt=R+},
where 1{·} is the zero–one indicator function. Given that the entrepreneur holds a
fraction k of the equity, she will receive an amount of cash kdt, which is equal to ct.
The amount of size–adjusted cash reserves in the next period is as follows:
mt+1 = (1 + r)(mt +Rt −R− dt) = m∗,
which implies that wt+1 = kmt+1 = w∗, as required.
- When mt belongs to [m∗∗,m∗), the optimal contract specifies that ct = ct = 0 and
wt+1 = (1 + r)(w
c
t +
(1− p)B
∆p
) and wt+1 = (1 + r)(w
c
t −
B
∆p
).
In the implementation, the firm distributes no dividends, which implies that the en-
trepreneur receives no cash compensation, as required. Since the firm pays R to its
debt holders, the size–adjusted cash reserves evolve according to:
mt+1 = (1 + r)(mt +Rt −R) =
{
(1 + r)
(
mt + (1− p)(R+ −R−)
)
if Rt = R+;
(1 + r)
(
mt − p(R+ −R−)
)
if Rt = R−.
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It is immediate to check that
wt+1 = kmt+1 =
{
(1 + r)
(
wct + (1− p)B/∆p
)
if Rt = R+;
(1 + r)
(
wct − pB/∆p
)
if Rt = R−,
as required by the optimal contract.
- When mt < m∗∗, it is obvious for the case of high recapitalization costs. In the case of
low recapitalization costs, the optimal contract specifies that:
ct = 0, and ct = −
1
1 + τ
(w∗∗ − wct )
and
wt+1 = (1 + r)(w
c
t +
(1− p)B
∆p
) and wt+1 =
pB
∆p
.
In the implementation, following high cashflows, the firm is in its normal functioning
state: it pays the promised repayment to its debt holders and does not distribute
dividends. Hence, the entrepreneur receives no cash, as required. The evolution of the
size–adjusted cash reserves is as follows:
mt+1 = (1 + r)(mt +R+ −R),
therefore wt+1 = kmt+1 = (1 + r)(wct +
(1−p)B
∆p
). However, following low cashflows, the
firm is restructured: an amount of it := m∗∗ −mt of new equity is issued. Since the
entrepreneur takes up a fraction k of the new issuance, the total costs for her are equal
to kit = w∗∗−wct , which means that ct = − 11+τ (w∗∗−wct ), as required. Moreover, since
the current debt service is written off by τ
1+τ
it, the size–adjusted cash reserves evolve
as follows:
mt+1 = (1 + r)(mt +R− − (R− τ
1 + τ
it) +
1
1 + τ
it).
It is immediate to check that wt+1 = kmt+1 =
pB
∆p
.
Q.E.D.
Appendix B Renegotiation–proofness
Hitherto we have assumed that the contracting parties fully commit to the financial
contract ex–ante. We now relax this assumption by taking into account the possibility of
renegotiating the long–term contract if some Pareto–improving opportunity becomes avail-
able. Our interest is to verify whether the optimal contracts characterized previously are
renegotiation–proof.
Notice that when V ′(0) < τ
1+τ
, the investors’ continuation–utility function F is always
decreasing in the entrepreneur’s promised utility. Hence, at any period, after some history,
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if we increase the continuation payoff initially offered to the entrepreneur, the investors are
worse off and vice versa. That implies that there does not exist any outcome which could
yield higher payoffs to all parties. In other words, for the case where V ′(0) < τ
1+τ
the optimal
contract characterized in Proposition 2 is robust to the renegotiation possibility.
In case where V ′(0) > τ
1+τ
, as Lemma 3 in Appendix A shows, the first derivative of the
function V is smaller than 1 for all w ≥ pB
∆p
. Therefore, the investors’ continuation utility
F is decreasing in the entrepreneur’s payoff on the interval [pB/∆p,∞). Considering the
optimal contract described in Proposition 2, we see that for the case where V ′(0) > τ
1+τ
it
never offers the entrepreneur a continuation utility less than pB
∆p
, which indicates that at no
period is any continuation contract is able to make all contracting parties better off. As a
consequence, the contract is also renegotiation–proof.
References
Barberis, N., Huang, M., Santos, T., 2001. Prospect theory and asset prices. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 116, 1 – 53.
Benartzi, S., Thaler, R. H., 1995. Myopic loss aversion and the equity premium puzzle.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 73 – 92.
Berk, J., DeMarzo, P., 2010. Corporate Finance (2nd Edition). Prentice Hall.
Biais, B., Mariotti, T., Plantin, G., Rochet, J.-C., Nov. 2004. Dynamic security design.
CEPR Discussion Papers 4753, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Biais, B., Mariotti, T., Plantin, G., Rochet, J.-C., 2007. Dynamic security design: Con-
vergence to continuous time and asset pricing implications. Review of Economic Studies
74 (2), 345–390.
Biais, B., Mariotti, T., Rochet, J.-C., Villeneuve, S., 01 2010. Large risks, limited liability,
and dynamic moral hazard. Econometrica 78 (1), 73–118.
Choné, P., LeMeur, H., 2001. Non-convergence result for conformal approximation of vari-
ational problems subject to a convexity constraint. Numerical Functional Analysis and
Optimization 22 (5-6), 529–547.
Clementi, G. L., Hopenhayn, H. A., 02 2006. A theory of financing constraints and firm
dynamics. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 121 (1), 229–265.
de Meza, D., Webb, D. C., 2007. Incentive design under loss aversion. Journal of the European
Economic Association 5, 66 – 92.
DeMarzo, P. M., Fishman, M. J., January 2007a. Agency and optimal investment dynamics.
Review of Financial Studies 20 (1), 151–188.
38
DeMarzo, P. M., Fishman, M. J., November 2007b. Optimal long-term financial contracting.
Review of Financial Studies 20 (6), 2079–2128.
DeMarzo, P. M., Sannikov, Y., December 2006. Optimal security design and dynamic capital
structure in a continuous-time agency model. Journal of Finance 61 (6), 2681–2724.
Dittmann, I., Maug, E., Spalt, O., 2010. Sticks or carrots? optimal ceo compensation when
managers are loss averse. Journal of Finance 65, 2015 –2050.
Ekeland, I., Moreno-Bromberg, S., 2010. An algorithm for computing solutions of variational
problems with global convexity constraints. Numerische Mathematik 115 (1), 45–69.
Ekeland, I., Turnbull, T., 1983. Infinite-Dimensional Optimization and Convexity. the Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
Franks, J. R., Sanzhar, S. V., 2006. Evidence on debt overhang from distressed equity issues.
Working Paper, London Business School, 1–43.
Herweg, F., Mï£¡ller, D., Weinschenk, P., 2010. Binary payments schemes: Moral hazard
and loss aversion. American Economic Review 100, 2451 – 2477.
Hoffmann, F., Pfeil, S., 2010. Reward for luck in a dynamic agency model. Review of Finan-
cial Studies 23 (9), 3329–3345.
Jostarndt, P., January 2009. Equity offerings in financial distress – evidence from german
restructurings. Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr) 61 (1), 84–111.
Kahneman, D., Tversky, A., 1979. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk.
Econometrica 47, 263 – 292.
Myers, S., 1977. The determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics
5, 147–175.
Ross, S., Westerfield, R., Jordan, B., 2008. Fundamentals of Corporate Finance. McGraw-
Hill/Irwin, New York, NY.
Sannikov, Y., 2008. A continuous–time version of the principal–agent problem. Review of
Economic Studies 75 (3), 957–984.
Spear, S. E., Srivastava, S., October 1987. On repeated moral hazard with discounting.
Review of Economic Studies 54 (4), 599–617.
39
